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Abstract:
This thesis looks at the relationship between the Workers’ Party and the Party of
Brazilian Social Democracy -arguably the two most powerful parties in Brazil- and why,
even though, both parties are considered leftist they have never formed an alliance.
Through the first two chapters the thesis highlights the changes experienced by both
parties from the 1980s to the early 2000s, and how each has become the party they are
now. This thesis contains a case study that focuses on the relationship of both parties
from 1988 through 2002 at the municipal level in the city of Ribeirao Preto, Sao Paulo,
Brazil. The city of Ribeirao Preto was chosen as the case study because it is in the state
of Sao Paulo, where both parties were founded, and remain strong to this day, and
because the position of mayor has been controlled by one of the two parties since 1992.
This thesis concludes that both parties have become rivals due to the inherent pragmatism
of the Brazilian system, which leads the Workers’ Party to seek political space by
moderating its position and the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy to recruit local elites
to its party.
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Abbreviations:
Parties:
PT:

Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)- One of the most
influential political parties in Brazil. It is a leftist party and was founded
in 1980. One of its most famous leaders is Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva,
Brazil’s current president (2002-present).

PSDB:

Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Party of Brazilian Social
Democracy)- Another influential leftist party. It is strongest in the state
of Sao Paulo. It split away from the PMDB in 1988. Its most well
known leader is former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (19941998; 1998-2002).

PMDB:

Partido Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party)- One of the largest parties in Brazil. It is a centrist
catch-all party and was originally named the MDB (Democratic
Movement). As the MDB it was the “official” opposition party in the
bipartisan system created by the military government. One of its most
leaders is former president Jose Samey (1985-1990).

PFL:

Partido da Frente Liberal (Party of the Liberal Front)- This is one of
Brazil’s largest parties. It is a conservative parties with strong ties in
Brazil’s northeast, especially in the state of Bahia. It was formed in
1985, when it split from the PDS. During the time of the dictatorship
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the PFL and the PDS were part of the ARENA party, which was the
political wing of the military government. Its most well-known leader
w as Antonio Carlos Magalhaes(1927-2007)
DEM:

Democratas (Democrats) - In 2007 the PFL changed its name to
Democratas.

PDT:

Partido Democratico Trabalhista (Democratic Labor Party)- Another
moderately leftist party. It was founded by Leonel Brizola (1992-2004),
who was considered to be the ideological heir of former president
Vargas (1930-1945; 1951-1954).

PTB:

Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party)- This is a catch
all party, which shares its name with a leftist party created by Getulio
Vargas. In practice it has few things in common with the PTB of the
Vargas era.

PDS:

Partido Democratico Social (Democratic Social Party) - This was
another conservative party in Brazil. It had strong ties to the
southeastern state of Sao Paulo. It formed, together with the PFL, part of
the ARENA. Its most famous member is former Sao Paulo mayor,
Paulo Maluf. In 1994 it merged with the PDC to form the PPB, which
later became the PP.

PDC:

Partido Democratico Cristao (Christian Democratic Party). It merged
with the PDS thus forming the Party that would eventually become the
PP.

PP:

Partido Popular (Popular Party) See PDS and PDC entry.
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Organizations:
SEBRAE:

Sei^vigo Brasileiro de Apoio as Micro e Pequenas Empresas - A
government owned institution that helps individuals start small
businesses.

ACI:

Associa^ao Comercial e Industrial - This is an advocacy group
dedicated to the advancement issues that are important to businesses. It
is roughly equivalent to Chamber of Commerce.

FIESP:

Federa9ao das Indiistrias do Estado de Sao Paulo- It is an advocacy
group that pursues the interests of Industry in Sao Paulo.

TSE:

Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Brazilian Electoral Court) - It is the highest
electoral court in Brazil. The electoral court system is responsible for all
elections held in Brazil.

TRE;

Tribunal Regional Eleitroal (Regional Electoral Court) — These are
regional courts that are below the TSE and are responsible for elections
held in their respective states.
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Introduction:
Intense rivalries between political parties are part and parcel of any electoral
democracy. Most commonly the reasons are ideological. Economically liberal parties
usually compete against socialist parties. Fascist parties in Europe during the 1920s were
engaged in a fierce rivalry with communist parties. In many Latin American countries
the oligarchies which fought over power usually broke down as radicals or conservatives.
In Brazil, however, the two dominant parties today are both on the left. One would
expect that the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democracy
Party, PSDB)and the Partido dos Trabalhadores(Workers’ Party) should be natural
allies. The leaders of both parties were in opposition to the military dictatorship in the
late 1970s and early 1980s and both parties were founded on a socialist platform. In
practice, however, they have become perennial competitors for the position of the
country’s dominant party. Their candidates competed as front-runners in the last four
presidential elections. This stmggle over preeminence plays out in some of Brazil s most
populous and most prosperous states.
This thesis addresses the question of why this natural alliance never materialized.
More specifically it asks, what has occuired in the relationship between the PSDB and
the PT that has conspired against such an alliance despite occasional talks about its
promise? This thesis attempts to answer those questions through four perspectives: the
PT at the federal level, the PSDB at the federal level, the relationship of both parties at
the local level and the reasons behind and implications of the relationship. As the
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research on this thesis progressed it revealed some sub-questions that became crucial to
the understanding of the topic. What kind of leftist parties were the PT and PSDB when
they started ? What kind are they now? What has caused them to change? How did these
changes affect each party in the day to day politics of Brazil?
The relationship between the PT and the PSDB needs to be researched, because of
its implications. Both parties are from Brazil’s most populous and economically
prosperous state, Sao Paulo. For nearly twenty years both parties have been, arguably,
the two most powerful parties in Brazil, and have put forth the main candidates in the last
four elections (1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006). As events currently stand, it seems unlikely
that their power will weaken any time soon. Also, the evolution of their relationship
reveals many interesting elements of the Brazilian political system that will inevitably
affect all parties in Brazil.
Understanding the research methodology is essential for the greater discernment
of the results and the argument put forth in this text. The principal sources used were:
new'spaper articles, interviews, and secondary works. Newspaper articles came from two
main methods: first, the internet through search engines, such as Lexis Nexis. The
second method, called for the researcher to digitally photograph the newspaper, A
Cidaclc. at the municipal archives of Ribeirao Preto. The local newspaper's articles along
with the interviews conducted were used to address the case study (Chapter III). All
electoral results were taken from the Tribunal Superior Eleitroal(Supreme Electoral
Tribunal, TSE)or the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral de Sdo Paulo (Regional Electoral
Tribunal of Sao Paulo, TRE-SP). The interv iews conducted of people involved in
politics of Ribeirao Preto w'ere used mostly for background and so were not transcribed.
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The first chapter focuses on the ideological evolution of the PT. It traces the
party's ideological development from its beginnings in the early 1980s to the election of
Lula as president of Brazil in 2002. It highlights the major turning points in the
ideological evolution of the PT. This is cmcial to the understanding of how the PT
changed from being “the opposition party'’ that advocated socialism to a party that now
accepts the capitalist system. This history will also reveal some of the reasons behind the
PT's inability to unite with the PSDB.
The second chapter addresses the ideological evolution of the PSDB. The
chronological coverage is slightly shorter than for the PT. It runs from the PSDB's
founding in the late 1980s through the eight year administration of President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso and ends with the electoral loss in 2002. This chapter will highlight
the PSDB's main ideological turning points, namely its emergence as the government
party of the mid-1990s, in an attempt to show how it evolved from a leftist party to the
centrist party it is today.
Chapter three focuses on the PT-PSDB relationship at the local level. A case
study of the city of Ribeirao Preto in the interior of Sao Paulo state illustrates the
dynamics of the rivalry. Ribeirao Preto is an apt case study, because both parties have
alternated power since.1992. The city is also home to one of the PT’s most powerful
politicians. The chapter will show how the relationship between both parties evolved
from one of cooperation during the first PT administration (1992-1995)through the
changes in the mid-1990s to the rivalry it is today. It also considers how the parties'
evolution at the national level affected the party at the local level. This chapter provides
an explanation as to why the PSDB and the PT have such difficulties forming an alliance.
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Chapter IV concludes the thesis with an analysis of the PT-PSDB relationship
nationally and in Ribeirao Preto. It builds on the first three chapters and provides a
broader inteipretation for the PT-PSDB rivalry. The last part of tliis chapter examines the
broader implications of the case study for Brazilian politics as a whole.
The study of this rivalry is important for any Brazil scholar, because it uncovers
many facets of the Brazilian political system. It reveals which positions in government
hold the most prestige, and power, and how politicians interact with each other given
their respective positions. It also uncovers what affects Brazil’s Proportional
Representation, Multimember district has on its parties in general.
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Chapter I;
The Partido dos Trabalhadores
The Workers' Party in Brazil can be described as a ‘leftist party.' This
classification, however, does not do the party justice. It identifies itself with both the
urban and rural working class and also extends its support to oppressed minorities, such
as homosexuals. The party considers the payment of Brazil’s social debt its broad goal.
This idea stems from the belief that the nation’s wealth has always come at the expense
of a certain class. The Workers' Party believes that there is an urgent need to reimburse
these oppressed segments of the population through wealth distribution policies such
policies as agrarian reform, so as to achieve a more just and equitable society. The party
has become very inclusive with regards to other left ot center movements, because such
an ideal is, by its nature, broad.
There were earlier attempts at creating a party of the workers, but they were
usually led by a member of the social elite. The best example of this was the the Partido
Trahalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party, PTB)created by Getulio Vargas in 1945 to
gain the support of the workers in Brazil. The difference between Vargas Labor Party
and the modem day Workers’ Party is the greater legitimacy the PT enjoys among the
workers because it was created and controlled by them. The Brazilian Labor Party, in
contrast, organized itself in a top down manner with no real autonomy for the local trade

' Julia Michaels. Brazil's Workers' Party Recasts its Image. Seeks Allies in Bid to Remodel' the State, in
"The W(irld." 3/6/1992. Christian Science Monitor. Boston. 4.

I
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unions." The workers accepted this corporatist model because they saw it as an extension
of their social and organizational rights.'^
The military's abuse of the Brazilian State’s corporatist structure led the workers
to become more politically active. The wage recovery strikes of 1978-1979 increased the
political awareness among the workers of Sao Paulo.*^ The Sao Paulo labor unions held
these strikes for the purpose of obtaining an increase in real wages, which decreased due
to inflation. The leaders of these strikes realized that the military government s coercive
apparatus (i.e. the government's corporatist machine) would always be called upon to end
strikes in favor of the employers.^ These union leaders believed that strikes would never
be enough to “push through reforms required to bring real improvements to worker s
position."^ They concluded that the only way for their political interest to be defended on
the political stage was for them to do it themselves and in June of 1980 union leaders
founded the Workers' Party.
One of the PT’s most striking characteristics, since its inception, is its
factionalism. They are a result of the political system around which the PT arose. The
military government deemed many leftist groups illegal at the time of the PT’s creation.
These groups saw in the PT an opportunity to obtain a legal conduit for their policies and
ideas. Party leaders feared that the inclusion of such groups into the party would destine it
to become an umbrella organization. Despite these fears, party members could not
openly debate the problem of what Margaret Keck calls “dual militancy,” because to do

'
1 orcuato Di Telia 2004. 74.
'Margaret E. Keck. 1992. The Workers Party and Democratization in Brazil. New Haven: Yale University.
.■'^2.

" Margaret Keck 1992, 64-67.
^ Margaret Keck 1992, 67.
Bernardo Kucinski. 2003. "The Rise of the Workers’ Party." in Lula and the Workers' Parry. Branford.
.Sue and Bernardo Kucinski. New York: The New Press. 35.
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so was “tantamount to denouncing someone to the police.’"^ These groups eventually
organized themselves into factions that strived for control of the party in much the same
way that political parties seek control of a legislative body. Lula s modoxoit Articularao
faction, for example, has controlled the party for much of its existence. Luiza Erundina
de Souza (Erundina). the former mayor of Sao Paulo, belongs to the more radical Xiita
(Shiite) faction. The PT's fragmentation made its devotion to internal democracy even
more important, Intemally the party was organized in a way that insured its internal
democracy and links to civil society.^ When the party first formed it was supposed to
take the following bottom-to-top shape: each member was to belong to a “nucleus; each
nucleus was subject to one local directorate; these local directorates were subject to one
9

regional directorate, which was itself subject to the national directorate.
The PT grew throughout the 1980s and became one of the main political parties
on the left. Its numbers swelled to 276.000 members. 30.000 of which were active party
members.

This rise culminated with two electoral successes: the mayoral elections of

1988 and the presidential elections of 1989. In the mayoral elections, the PT won control
of many municipalities including Sao Paulo. South America’s largest metropolis. It also
won control of other state capitals including: Rio Grande do Sul s Porto Alegre, and
Espirito Santo’s Vitoria. The party’s other great electoral feat came during the
presidential election of 1989 when Lula reached the second round of the elections. Lula
actually led in the polls for a large portion of the race, but could not contain the electoral
momentum behind Fernando Collor de Mello(PRN). At the end of the first round. Lula

Margaret Keck 1992, 95.
Margaret Keck 1992, 104-105.
“Margaret Keck 1992, 103-108.
Latin .America Regional Report 1/1/1981
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obtained 16.08 percent of the valid vote to Collor’s 28.52 percent,

Lula’s success in
12

reaching the second round established him as the main leftist leader in Brazil. Brizola,
a famous leftist figure of the Second Republic previously held that position. More
importantly, Lula's success provided the PT with an added credibility thus cementing it
as a party with an actual chance to win. The PT’s accomplishments frightened many PT
opponents on the right who focused on the PT’s more radical elements in an attempt to
frighten people away from the party. President Jose Samey told the newspaper O Globo,
that Brazil was “sliding down the slope to socialist revolution,

Statements made by

some of the PT's most prominent candidates were very radieal. Remarks made by Luiza
Erundina de Souza publicly stated that the “right to occupy land comes before the right to
property” and that, at times, the use of violence as a means of change was

valid.”

Although Erundina was from a radical faction, her views were not very different from
13

that of the PT as a whole.

The PT’s clear ideology and ethics led to its growth in the 1980s. Its stances on
issues such as privatization, debt repayment and wealth distribution clearly defined the
PT as a leftist party. It held that the state had to control all sectors considered “essential
in the people's lives.” Lula’s presidential platform in 1989 stated that a PT government
would nationalize the banking, transportation, education and healthcare industries.
rate
Lula’s platform also stated that a PT government would immediately defer interest
payments on Brazil’s foreign debt, and would, together with all the other indebted nations

" Margaret Keck 1992.158.
Brizf)la was defeated by an extremely thin margin. He lost the second place ot the election to Lula who
obtained 16.08% to his 15.45%.
1 .1

Latin America Weekly Report 1/5/1989. 2.
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.,14

of the third w orld, “confront their creditors.

The PT also advocated certain wealth

distribution policies, such as agrarian reform. Aside from the party’s ideological stance,
the PT's ethos attracted many follow'ers. PT members were known for being radical and
altruistic. This led the electorate to view the PT as an ethical party whose members were
less likely to engage in practices of corruption, nepotism and careerism that are so
15

prevalent in Brazilian politics.

The PT benefited greatly from this image of the

.16

“outsider party.’

Other politicians resented the party for what they saw as the party s
17

‘aiTogant and self-righteous attitude of moral superiority.’
The same ideology that led to its success in the 1980s became a cause of the PT s
decline in the middle of the 1990s. There was a major internal debate within the party
over its ideological future. Hardliners argued that the PT should keep its Marxist
elements because class stmggle would always exist as long as there were both a capitalist
and a labor class. Party moderates, on the other hand, believed that the PT should adopt a
18

more centrist policy not unlike that of the European social democrats,

In the end, the

moderate factions won out and the PT would follow a new model. The ‘new PT rejected
policies that had previously been core concepts, which included: a repudiation of
“bureaucratic socialism” with one central party and a centrally planned economy,
abandonment of the notion of a dictatorship of the proletariat, a formal rejection of
violence as a means of political change. The party issued a declaration stating that the
best way for Cuba to overcome the U.S, embargo was to democratize. It also lifted the

N
IS

Latin America Weekly Report 1/5/1989, 2.
Bernardo Kucinski 2003. 32-33.

Ih

W'illiam R. Nylen. 2003. Participatory Democracy versus Elitist Democracy: Lessons from Brazil. New
York; Palgrave Mcmillan. 39.
'' Bernardo Kucin.ski 2003. 32-33.
l«
Latin .America Weekly Report 10/1 1/1990, 6.
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prohibition on the formation of alliances with non-socialist parties. The PT attempted to
reign in its more radical factions by forbidding them from having their own press.
premises and international links.
These changes were a result of the broader crisis within Marxist thought in the
late 1980s and early 1990s brought about by the fall of the Soviet Union and other
communist models. The Marxist notion of class conflict, which had alw^ays been central
19

to the PT's philosophy, w'as now in doubt,

The PT adapted to tliis by stating that the

fall of these models were not a fall of socialism, but rather the fall of 'Stalinism and
^:o
The broader ‘theme’ of the changes adopted by the
totalitarianism posing as socialism.
PT during the National Congress of 1991 was the formal recognition of democracy as the
only way forward. This was a significant step away from its more hard-line Marxist
elements.
Internal problems hampered the PT’s attempts at portraying itself as

a less radical

party during the elections of 1994. Lula’s substantial lead in the early polls suggests that,
at first, the PT’s new image appeared to work. Those elections marked the first time that
the PT’s candidate aggressively courted businessmen in Brazil. Lula abandoned the
“poor versus rich" stance that won him many votes in the 1989 elections. Despite the
PT's best efforts to portray Lula as a more centrist candidate there were many points of
confusion. For example, Lula’s platform stated that he would hold meetings to
restructure Brazil’s foreign debt and if it became ‘necessary’ his government would
21

abandon such payments." Lula eventually ‘clarified’ his position stating that he would

20

Latin America Weekly Report 12/19/1991.8.
Bernardo Kiicinski 2003. 57.
Latin America Weekly Report 5/12/1994, 199.
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honor debts approved by congress." The PT's tactical mistakes came as a result of its
internal divisions. The party divided campaign operations among different factions and
regions making a unified campaign almost impossible.”'^ But the major political reason
for Lula's defeat was the success of Cardoso’s Real economic plan."** After its defeat in
the presidential elections the PT vowed to be a “constructive opposition” meaning that it
■>5

would support government programs it believed were good for the Brazilian people.
The PT suffered through a period of political weakness during the mid-1990s.
Cardoso's governing bloc was positioned so strongly that it could implement many
changes to the constitution, allowing the president to seek a second term. Privatizations
occurred at an increasing pace. The acceptance of neo-liberalism by many segments of
society during this time severely undercut the PT’s appeal. The party could not even
26

formulate an alternative policy that was acceptable to the electorate,

The uncertainty

within the PT appeared prior to the presidential election of 1998. Lula, the PT s honorary
president, did not want to run against Cardoso again, because he did not want to be
portrayed as the man destined to lose, which was very likely given Cardoso s
popularity."^ Despite these reservations, Lula announced that he would once again be a
candidate for president.
The PT’s overarching strategy during the election of 1998 was to portray the party
as a sensible alternative to the PSDB. The PT’s main strategy was to highlight the social

■■ Lula tries to sooth Investor: Many still skeptical about his intentions. 6/9/1994. in Finance.
America Regional Reports: Brazil 4.
Bernardo Kucinski 2003, 40-41.
-■* A definition of the Real Plan can be found in the PSDB chapter of this thesis.

Latin

PTon the verge of real 'breakthrough': Lula said party to e.xercise constructive opposition. 12/1/1994.
in “Politics." Latin American Regional Reports 6.
■‘’Bernardo Kucinski 2003, 42-44.
Candidates to Start to enter the ring: Lula admits he ll run. but Collor is still Barred. 12/9/1997. in
“Barzil: Politics." Latin America Weekly Report 580.
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deficiencies of the Real plan and the Cardoso administration in general and to push Lula
as a viable alternative to Cardoso. The party emphasized the unemployed and the poor as
those left behind by the Cardoso administration’s economic policies. The PT also
stressed the government’s failures in the education and healthcare sectors. The other side
of the PT's strategy was to make Lula appear to be more of a centrist candidate. Lula s
campaign, for example, opted to use the national colors of yellow and green more often
28

than the PT’s traditional red." He also publicly stated that if he won he would not
reverse the privatizations, which had occurred under previous governments, because he
29

did not feel that it was a priority for the country,

Despite the many attempts by Lula

and the PT to calm the electorate, his campaign still made tactical mistakes that
jeopardized his position. One major problem came from his running mate, Leonel
30

Brizola, who publicly stated that if elected he would attempt to reverse privatizations.
Brizola’s remarks unsettled many PT members because they renewed fears of what a
potential Lula-Brizola government would do economically and because it showed a
disagreement within the alliance. In the end, however, Cai*doso was again elected in the
first round over Lula, this time by an even larger margin. Even more disheartening to the
PT was that all could see that Brazil’s economy was heading downward and still Cardoso
won.31 In other words, people still felt more comfortable v/ith Cardoso’s small economic
promises than with Lula’s more grandiose promises of investing thirty vast sums of
money in the promotion of small and medium businesses.

Cardoso Launches re-election bid: Lida promises millions ofjobs, but isfar behind in polls. 8/1 1/1998.
in "P()litic.s.” Intelligence Re.search Ltd. 2.
Cardoso Welcomes Lula Brizola Ticket. 2/10/1998. in -Politic.s.’' Intelligence Research Ltd. 2.
Cracks appear in opposition alliance. 6/23/1998. in “Brazil; PcWitics.' Latin America Weekly Report.
280.
Cardoso electedfora second term. 10/6/1998. in “Brazil; Politics.” Latin America Weekly Report. 458.

Cerdeira 16 of67

Senior Thesis

The PT of the late 1990s and early 2000s moderated itself even more than it had
previously been. The moderate Articula^ao faction began to dominate the PT’s internal
politics. Its leader, Jose Dirceu, won the presidency of the party three consecutive times.
While calls for the PT to adopt more radical proposals were still present, they were much
less influential. There was an internal move within the PT to isolate the more radical
factions.

This moderation went further than the PT’s previous attempts, because the PT

now recognized Brazil’s economic model. All of the economic and political reforms
proposed by the PT were to be carried out “within the framework of Capitalism. The PT
also recognized that it needed a wide coalition” to implement its reforms.' The PT s
recognition went further than the previous attempt at moderation, in which the PT
recognized that all of its reforms would be done within the framework of Democracy.
The PT in 1998 affirmed that there was no other alternative to capitalism. Instead of
offering the electorate an entirely new system the PT began to offer them a

humanized”
34

This was a

version of capitalism that sought to improve the quality of life of the people,
much more pragmatic party.
The electorate responded to the PT’s more moderate nature. It was no longer seen
as the radical party that espoused leftist rhetoric. As former president of the Sao Paulo
based industrialist group FIESP, Mario Amato, stated. “The PT no longer scares me."
This quote is significant because FIESP had always been against the PT which they
35

considered a threat to the economic security of Brazil,

The party began to hold

meetings on poverty with the business community and others on the right including the

" Bernardo Kucinski 2003,60.
^Bernardo Kucinski. 2003. 40-42.
"William R. Nylen 2003.38.
L.cft streni>rhens grip on hig cities. 1 1/21/2000. "Politics. Latin America Regional Reports. 2.
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governor of Bahia, Antonio Carlos Magalhaes.

The PT’s electoral strategy in 2002 was

to portray itself and Lula as the sensible alternative to the PSDB and Cardoso. The PT
dropped its radical rhetoric. Lula himself stated that the debate between socialism and
capitalism was out of date. The party emphasized that it had accepted both Brazil s
democracy and its capitalist economy. The PT was dedicated to “moderate’ government
intervention in the economy. This appealed to many voters who had just suffered from a
slowdown in the economy and rolling blackouts throughout the country, both of which
37

were blamed on the government.

The PT capitalized on this unhappiness in 2002 and

was able to elect Lula as the President of Brazil. The PT along with its electoral allies
formed a coalitional government that was to administer Brazil for the next four years.
The PT over its twenty-eight year history has undergone a series of moderations.
It has evolved from a Marxist party to a left-wing party. Its most dynamic changes came
in the 1990s in which the party abandoned certain undemocratic Marxist ideals, such as
the dictatorship of the proletariat. It has gone even further than that by accepting the new
realities of Brazil’s economy. The Lula administration has not radically changed the
economy. They have kept to the previous administration s economic policy, which is
often, ironically enough, one of the main criticisms levied against it. The PT’s more
moderate factions have been able to mold the party into a more pragmatic entity.

Antonio Carlos Magalhaes (1927-2007) was an extremely powerful politician from the stale of Bahia.
He is a symbol of the political right in Brazil.
PT ndtivcites reassuring image. 8/7/2001. in ‘'Politics.” Latin America Regional Reports. 2.
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Chapter II:
The PSDB and the ^‘Modern Left:”
There have been few parties in Brazil as influential as the Partido da Social
Democracia Brasileira (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, PSDB). The PSDB
spearheaded many of the neo-liberal reforms and constitutional amendments. It has also
been a serious contender in four of the five presidential elections held since the end of the
dictatorship. The PSDB has also consistently been one of the largest paities in congress.
Since 1999, the PSDB has been one of the four largest parties in the Chamber of
Deputies.'^ The PSDB has also won numerous governorships, including in the most
populous states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and especially Sao Paulo, which has been
controlled by a PSDB governor since 1995.
The PSDB has shifted towards the ideological center since its inception. When it
was first formed it was considered to be the leftist elements of the PMDB s leftwing
was
which rebelled against that party’s shift towards the right. The PSDB s early image
that of a leftist party. It only allied itself with other leftist parties. The party

s most

t'anious leaders, such as Mario Covas and Fernando Henrique Cardoso were all well
known leftist leaders. Covas and Cardoso were responsible for the inclusion of some of
the more socialist leaning amendments in the constitution. The PSDB grew in strength
until Cardoso was elected President of the Brazil in 1994. Under his administration, the
PSDB’s shift further towards the ideological center. The party aligned itself with parties

” Bancada no Posse. 1/25/2008. Camara dos Deputados.
http://\\\vA\2.Ljmaru.«Z(n hi/demitack^s/pusse hlml.
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on the political right and Cardoso’s administration implemented many neo-liberal
reforms of which privatization is the most obvious. So what happened to this party?
How has the PSDB turned from a leftist party to one which supports many neo-liberal
positions? This chapter seeks to trace the history of the PSDB at the federal and at the
state level in an effort at explaining how the party changed its ideology.
The PSDB’s origin is linked to the negotiations surrounding the PMDB. These
negotiations occiin*ed both internally and externally. The Military dictatorship changed
the party system in the early 1980s in an effort to break the power of the PMDB. The
principal strategy of the military was the legalization of other parties. The military
government hoped that by abandoning the two-party system it would be able break up the
39

PMDB.

Its position for many yeai's as the only legal opposition party gave the PMDB

an umbrella characteristic (i.e. an amalgamation of opposition groups). The main uniting
force holding it together was its position as the main opposition party against the
dictatorship.'*^^ Most PMDB members at that time decided to remain within the PMDB,
which was at the pinnacle of its strength. Even with electoral rules biased against the
opposition, the PMDB had had some promising victories against the PDS culminating in
the gubernatorial election of 1982 in which it won many mayoral seats and governorships
41

such as that of Sao Paulo.

The PMDB’s main goal in the 1980s was the defeat of the

ruling PDS. Its main strategy for this was to attract as many opposition elements under
its name as possible. This desire to be single opposition party soon led to a shift in the
PMDB's internal balance of power. The PMDB moved further towards the ideological

Torcualo Di Telia. 2004. History of Political Parties in Twentieth-Centurv Latin America. 148.
40

Timothy J. Power. 2001-2002 "Blairism Brazilian Style? Cardoso and the Third Way' in Brazil” in
Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 1 16 No: 4. 618.
'' T(K'iiato Di Telia 2004. 149.
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right since the party's merger with the conservative Pcirtido Popular(Popular Party, PP)
in 1982/- During the indirect elections for the presidency of Brazil, the PMDB selected
as its candidate the conservative Tancredo Neves. The PDS’s selection of the extremely
polarizing Paulo Maluf split the party into pro and anti Maluf factions. The anti-Maluf
faction split from the government party and formed the Partido da Frente Liberal
(Liberal Front Party, PFL). The PFL formed an alliance with the PMDB in supporting
Tancredo Neves who eventually won the indirect election for the presidency of Brazil.
Tancredo Neves’ sudden death before taking office exposed tension within the
PMDB. Vice-President Jose Samey(PMDB)assumed the presidency, but was

never

trusted by many segments within the PMDB due to his association with the military
government. The PMDB's alliance with the PFL also disturbed many of the traditional
PMDB members and led to many internal conflicts.

The most significant of these

conHicts occurred in the state of Sao Paulo, where the PMDB was dominated by the
politician Orestes Quercia. Quercia would not allow people not allied with him to rise to
power within the party. This infuriated party

members who found it impossible to find
44

any political space within the PMDB in Sao Paulo or nationally,

The lack of political

space coupled with the PMDB’s move towards to right culminated with a split in 1988,
which formed the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Party of Brazilian Social
Democracy, PSDB).
The PSDB was one of the most politically influential parties from its beginning.
With forty-five congressmen -eight senators and thirty-seven deputies- the PSDB was the
third largest party in congress. The PSDB was able to attract many members away from
This merger occurred because the government passed a law which forbade electoral alliances.
Timothy Power 2001-2002. 61 1-633.
Timt>thy Power 2001-2002,61 1-633.
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other parlies, but most were predominantly from the PMDB. Most of the PSDB members
45

were from the slate of Sao Paulo and were on the left of the political spectrum,

These

leaders soon became PSDB's greatest assets. Leaders, such as Senator Mario Covas, who
led the PMDB in the constituent assembly, former Sao Paulo Governor Franco Montoro
and prominent sociologist and Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso were all from Sao
Paulo state. Given this fact, it is not surprising that tlie party's base is in located mostly
in the State of Sao Paulo.
The PSDB’s powerbase in Sao Paulo makes it a prominent party nationally.
Historically, Sao Paulo has been a particularly important state both economically and
politically. Having slightly fewer than forty million inhabitants, it is tlie most populous
state and even dwarfs other Latin American countries. Economically, it produces a larger
share of Brazil's GDP than any other state. It has often been described as the engine
that pulls the other ‘boxcars* (i.e. the rest of Brazil). The city of Sao Paulo alone
46

produced 12.3 % of the nation’s GDP in 2005.

Politically, it has been at the center of

decision-making since the Old Republic (1889-1930). Currently, it is a very important
state for the national executive. Since 1988, all, but one of the presidential candidates,
who have qualified for a runoff are from Sao Paulo. Its most popular leaders have come
from that state including all of its presidential nominees. Since its split from the PMDB
in 1988, most of the seats the PSDB has won in the Chamber of Deputies have come
from Sao Paulo. After the 2006 election, the PSDB won eighteen out of Sao Paulo s

Timothy Power 2001-2002. 61 1-633.
Anali.se dos Resiiltado.s. 2007. in “ProduU^ Interno Bruto dos Municipios 2002-200.S." IBGE. 10.
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seventy seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In Brazil's northeast, by comparison, the
47

PSDB won just eighteen out of the 133 seats.
The PSDB was modeled on the Social Democratic parties of Western Europe.
Ideologically, there were very similar currents mnning through both the European parties
and the social democrats. Indeed, there were many personal connections between the
leaders of the PSDB and their European counterparts. Cardoso for example spent many
48

years in France and developed close ties with the Social Democrats of that country.
There were some major differences between the two, most notably PSDB s lack of ties to
mass society. The PSDB did not have close ties with any union groups as was the case
49

with their European counteipart, because the PT already occupied that space.
The presidential election of 1989 placed neo-liberalism as the major question
within the PSDB. The PSDB candidate for president. Senator Mario Covas began to
50

advocate economic liberalization.

By emphasizing that all of the changes he proposed

would be done within the capitalistic framework, Covas sought to become the candidate
of the “modem left;” who recognized that there were no practical alternatives to
51

capitalism.

This was a significant change given his stances on certain economic issues

during the writing of the new constitution in the mid 1980s. Covas came in a
52

disappointing fourth place with eleven percent of the popular vote.

This meant that the

PSDB had to decide which candidate to support in the second round of the election Luiz
Inacio “Lula” da Silva of the PT or Fernando Collor de Mello of the Partido Renovci^'do

47

Biincada tia Elei^ ao de 2006 para Deputado Federal(Titulares). 1/25/2008.in “Bancada na Eleii^ao."
Camara dos Deputados. h(tp://\vw w2.cama!a.!itn'.br/dcputados/clcicao.html.
48
Timothy Power 2001-2003. 61 1-633.
49
Timothy Power 2001-2003. 61 1-633.
>0
Ivo Dawnay. 7/1 1/89. Economy Steers Brazil Campaings. in "America News." Financial Times. 3.
Covas Introduces New Twist to Race. 7/13/1989. in "Brazil; Politics." Latin America Regional Report 2.
Timothy Power 2001-2002. 622.
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Nacional (National Renovation Party, PRN). The party was pretty evenly split.
Eventually, PSDB's support was officially given to Lula(PT) who had already begun to
attract some PSDB sympathizers.'**'^ Despite the PSDB’s official support of Lula, Collor
de Mello was able to attract about half of the PSDB votes and became the first popularly
54

elected president of Brazil since 1964.

The division within the PSDB between Lula and

Collor de Mello in this election highlighted an ideological rift between party members
who supported neo-liberalism and those who did not.
The PSDB's ideological split was further aggravated during the Collor de Mello
administration. Because the president’s party, the PRN, was very weak he sought to ally
himself with the PSDB. This alliance made some ideological sense as both sides sought
55

to turn Brazil into a parliamentary democracy.

High-level meetings were held between

the PSDB and the administration. In the end, a compromise was never reached because
of the high level of internal objections within the party to Collor de Mello s authoritarian
tendencies.’

The willingness of PSDB leaders to meet with Collor de Mello means that

. Had such
the PSDB was just as prepared to do elite level negotiating as any other party
an alliance been established the PSDB’s reputation would have most likely been
tarnished by the comiption scandal, which led to the impeachment of President Collor de
Mello in 1992 and the rise of Itamar Franco administration.
The PSDB’s role in the Itamar Franco administration allowed it to obtain greater
clout. President Franco named three party members as heads of ministries. The most
important of these was Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s nomination as head of the Finance

Voters Refuse to Wait For Leaders. 12/7/1989. in “Brazil; Politics.” Latin America Weekly Report. 4.
Forcuato Di Telia 151,2004.
Fhere wa.s a referendum held to determine what form ot democracy Brazil would have.
President's Search for Support. 7/26/1990. in “Brazil; Politics.” Latin America Weekly Report. 8.
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Ministry. It is arguably the most influential post in the executive, because it guides the
57

national economy.

Brazil's massive economic problems (e.g. hyperinflation) made this

ministry even more important. Since the early 1980s, there had been eight unsuccessful
attempts at curbing inflation and stabilizing the economy. This made the creation of an
effective stabilization plan a priority of the Franco administration and the PSDB. Finance
Minister Cardoso brought together a technocratic economic team charged with the
creation of a new stabilization plan. Cardoso himself was not very involved in the actual
formulation of the Real plan. Cardoso resigned himself to simply work through his
political connections to get the Plan approved.^^ The new plan successfully brought
down inflation from four digits in 1994 to two digits in 1995 and led to an increase in real
59

wages.

The success of the Real plan increased Cardoso’s prestige and popularity.

Cardoso, himself, would not see the full implementation of the plan as Finance Minister,
60

because of his decision to accept the presidential nomination of his party.
The elections of 1994 went extremely well for the PSDB. Cardoso secured the
presidency in the first round with fifty-four percent of the votes. His closest rival, Lula
61

(PT), obtained just twenty seven percent of the votes,
62

the main explanation for Cardoso’s victory,

The success of the Real plan was

Cardoso was able to take advantage of his

own personality and fear of a PT government to streamlining the “anti-Lula” vote behind
S'?

David Samuels. 2003. Ambition. Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil. Cambridge: University
Press. 18-19
For a definition of the Real Plan see: Eliana Cardoso. 2004. Monetary and Fiscal Reforms in Reforming
Brazil, ed. Maiiricio A. Font and Anthony Peter Spanakos. New York: Lexington Books. 31.
SI)

Eliana Cardo.so. 2004. Monetary and Fiscal Reforms in Reforming Brazil, ed. Maiiricio A. Font and
Anthony Peter Spanakos. New York: Lexington Books. 31.
60
Cardoso the de-Facto Anti-Lida Candidate. 5/5/1994. in “Peru.” Latin American Regional Reports.
Brazil. 2.
61
Cardoso Wins with 54% ofthe Votes. 10/27/1994. in “Brazil; Politics.” Latin America Weekly Report.
Brazil. Politics. 490.
Maiiricio Font. 2004. Introduction: Dawn ofa New Era in Reforming Brazil, ed. Mauricio A. Font and
.\nthony Peter Spanakos. New York: Lexington Books. 4.
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him/’-' The PSDB’s success in the 1994 elections extended to the states. The party won
the governorships of the three of the largest states in size of population and economy.
64

Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In the state of Sao Paulo, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso won twice as many votes as Lula.^^ Mario Covas won the
66

Governorship in the second round with fifty-six percent of the votes.

These results

were also felt at the legislative positions level. Jose Serra was the most voted senatorial
67

candidate with almost 6.5 million votes.

The two most voted candidates in the elections
68

for Federal Chamber of Deputy were also PSDB members.
The Real plan and the alliances made by the PSDB leaders changed the party,
The emergence of the new PSDB came from both internal and external forces. First, its
69

alliances with non-leftist parties, such as the PFL angered many party members.
Second, the success of the Real Plan gave greater prestige to the party s technocrat vis a
vis the politician in the party. This turned the party increasingly technocratic and neoliberal with the party’s traditional politicians using their talents as negotiators to approve
the plans of the “economists.” This position was soon consolidated as the prestige of the
politicians became dependent on the success of the economists and their plans. Third
w'as an influx of mercenary politicians, who switch parties

with the intention ofjoining
-a

the governing coalition as a means of acquiring government funds for his local aiea
03

Cardoso the de-Facto Anti-Lula Candidate. 0510511994,2.
● T tpr
Arnaido Cesar. 1 1/16/1994. Brazil: Huge State Debts Dampen Social Democratic Festivities, in inie Press Service.
Resultado Final do E.stado de Sao Paulo: Presidente da Repuhlica: I" Turno. 05/01/1999. m
“Resultado das Eleivoes 1994:Presidente da Republica." Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
Imp://w\\vs■ tsc■ UP\.br/intcrnet/index.htm 1.
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Resultado Final do Estado de Sao Paulo. Governador: r Turno. 01/29/2008. in Resultado das eiyoes
1994: Governador de Sao Paulo." Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
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Resultado Final do Estado de Sao Paulo: Senador: r Turno. 05/01/1999. in Resultado das E eiyi^es.
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
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very common practice in Brazil. These mercenary politicians are generally more
economically liberal than were the average PSDB member. These factors increased the
fmstration level of the more leftwing members of the PSDB who eventually left the party
further adding to the party’s rightw^ard ideological shift towards the center. The rise of
the economists and the exodus of the more leftist elements of the party resolved the issue
of neo-liberalism. After this point, the party became decidedly more

technocratic and

neo-liberal.
Understanding the PFL is important to comprehend just how profound the change
to the PSDB was. The PFL was a major partner with the PSDB at the national level.
Luis Eduardo Magalhaes of the PFL was the leader of the governing coalition in the
Chamber of Deputies. His father Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, one

of the most powerful

right-wing politicians of the last thirty years, led the government’s coalition in the senate.
The PFL was part of the PDS,the political wing of the military government. The PSDB
PFL alliance was surprising because it involved a union of people who were at opp
ends of the political debate during the military dictatorship. Many PSDB officials were
to the PFL
exiled by the military government. The Cardoso administration s concessions
in exchange for its support are indicative of the “new PSDB s

technocratic and

pragmatic nature.
The PSDB began to suffer political losses by the end of the 1990s. President
Cardoso was able to win reelection in 1998, but this win was not reflective of the party as
a w'hole. In 1996 the party still controlled the same number of governorships, but lost
was
two important states: Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. The campaign for governor
close for Mario Covas. With only slightly over 400 votes over the third place candidate.
Timothy Power 2001-2002,628-630.

Cerdeira 27 of 67

Senior Thesis
71

Covas barely made it into the second round,

Once there he defeated Paulo Maluf by

winning fifty-five percent to Malufs forty-five percent.^” President Cardoso still proved
73

very strong in Sao Paulo where he obtained sixty percent of the vote.

Nationally,

Cardoso’s second administration proved more difficult. Reforms such as, privatizations
->4

slowed to a virtual halt,

Cardoso’s popularity suffered greatly with the devaluation of

the Real. To make matters worse the PSDB’s coalition allies lost more members due to
corruption scandals, party switching and infighting. The only breathing room for the
PSDB came around the time of the 2000 municipal elections, when Cardoso s popularity
rose as the economy improved.^^ This small respite was not enough to hold the coalition
76

together and it fell apart when PFL left in protest.
The party, like the governing coalition as a whole, suffered during the last years
of Cardoso’s second administration. It was divided over who would succeed Cardoso as
the presidential nominee for the elections of 2002: Tasso Jereissati or Jose Serra. This
issue so alienated some party members, that once Serra had the nomination, some party
members supported other candidates.^^ Jereissati, for example, supported former PSDB
member Ciro Gomes in the first round of the election. Much of the support Serra did

Resultado Final do Estado de Sdo Paulo: Governador: r Tiinio. l/29/2(X)8. in “Resultado das
Eleiiy'oes." TSE.
~ Resultado Final do Estado de Sdo Paulo: Governador: 2** Tunio. 1/29/2008. in Resulta o as
Eleiyoes." TSE.
. ,
.
'' Resultado Final do Estado de Sdo Paulo: Presidente da Repiiblica: r Turno. 1/29/2008. in “Resultado
das Elei^'oes.’' TSE.
74
Maria Hermmia Tavares de Almeida. 2004. in Reforming Brazil, ed Mauricio A. Font and Anthony
Spanakos. New York: Lexington Books. 61.
73
Geoffe Dyer. 12/20/2000. Presidential Field Wide Open, in “Survey - Brazil: Finance and Investment.
Financial Times. London. 2
The PFL left, because it accused the PSDB -in particular Jose Serra's supporters- of orchestrating a
police investigation into its presidential candidate Roseana Sarney, which eventually led to her withdraw
from the race.(Raymond Colitt. 3/8/2002. Brazil's Coalition Collapses as Uirgest Party Pulls Out. in
“Front Page.” Financial Times. London 1).
■' Tasso Jereissati withdrew his candidacy for the PSDB's nomination for president, because, he felt,
internal strife was damaging the party s electoral prospect(Raymond Colitt. 12/19/2(X)l. Health Ministei
Ma\ Enter Race to Lead Brazil, in “The Americas.” Financial Times. London: Edition 2. page 1
■7(1
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receive in the states was “half-hearted at best,” The PSDB’s gubernatorial candidate for
the state of Ceara, said of Serra’s efforts to win his state “if(Serra) has few or many votes
.78

here that is his problem. Tm running one campaign and he another,

This lack of

support contributed to Serra's poor showing in certain states.
Even in the PSDB’s heartland of Sao Paulo state the paity did not do as well as it
had previously. Jose Serra obtained only 25.2% of the votes in the first round compared
to Lula’s 46.11%.^*^ The PSDB also failed to elect its senatorial candidate, Jose Anibal
80

Peres de Pontes.

The only good news for the PSDB was that the then Governor,

Geraldo Alckmin,^* was able to retain the PSDB’s control of the Governorship of the
state defeating Jose Genoino in the second round where they each got fifty-nine percent
82

and forty-one percent respectively.
If there is any one word that could describe the PSDB it would be: transformation.
It was created by prominent leftist politicians. As it obtained power, it underwent a
process of adaptation, which saw a change in the internal makeup of the party.
Economists gained strength over the politicians of the party. This coupled with its
alliance with the conservative PEL led the party further towards the center, creating

a

more technocratic party.

Raymond Colitt and Richard Lapper. 10/21/2002. Serra Campaign Struggling as Presidential Elections
Looms, in “The Americas.” Financial Times . 4.
71)
Resultado da Elei^do: I"" Turno-Presidente. 01/29/2008. TSE.
SO
Resultado da Elei^ao: 1° Titrno- Senador. 01/29/2008. TSE
SI
Gerlado Alckmin was Mario Covas’ Vice-Mayor and took over after the latter's death in 2001.
Resultado da Elei^ ao: 2" Turno- Governador. 01/29/2008. TSE
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Chapter III;
Case Study: Ribeirao Preto
The two previous chapters addressed the ideological and political development of
. ThePT
the PT and the PSDB. They revealed the moments of change of the two parties
chapter showed how that party's change was more gradual and more ideological. The
PSDB chapter revealed how that party's change was more

sudden than that of the PT’s.

But what does this mean for the party relationship at the local level? To address this
question, this chapter focuses on the development of both parties and their interaction in
the city of Ribeirao Preto.
The Ribeirao Preto is a good city to use as a case study of the PT-PSDB
relationship. It is located 200 miles northwest of Sao Paulo city. With over 500,000
inhabitants, it is one of the largest cities in the state of Sao Paulo. Economically, it is
known as one of the agricultural and technological centers of Brazil. Its size and
economic activity makes it a significant political prize. The PT and the PSDB ha
dominated the executive level politics of the city since

1992 and have been at odds with

each other since about 1995. It is also the home city of one of the PT’s most influential
politicians, Antonio Palocci Filho, who became the Finance Minister for President Lula.
The PT-PSDB rivalry in Ribeirao Preto emerged around the same time and for
similar reasons as the rivalry at the national level. Their relationship has evolved from a
period of non-association (1988-1989) to cooperation (1989-1995) and then to
antagonism (1995-present). In Ribeirao Preto the PT-PSDB rivalry resulted from the
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changes undergone by the PSDB in the mid-1990s. What follows is an analysis of the
political developments in the city of Ribeirao Preto from 1988 to 2006 and how these
changes have affected each party at the local level.
The mayoral election of 1988 revealed the PSDB’s ideological and political
position within the city. It took part in a broad leftist coalition, whose candidate, Joao
Cunha(PDT), had a legitimate chance of winning and eventually came in second. The
PSDB's participation in the Forc'd Esperanga(Hope Front, FE)alliance reflected its
leftist ideology. All of the parties that participated in that alliance were considered leftist,
the strongest of which -the PDT- was led nationally by one of the most well known leftist
84

leaders in Brazil, Leonel Brizola.

The PSDB’s association with FE demonstrates that,

locally, it was leftist pai'ty, which was true of the party at the national level as well. The
coalition’s success did not translate to the PSDB, however. It was unable to win even a
single seat in the Chamber of Aldermen. This result indicates that the PSDB had yet to
build any significant political presence -not surprising considering it was founded only a
few months earlier. This result was indicative of the PSDB’s showing in the late 1980s
85

throughout Brazil.
The PT’s national policies were the main reason why it also performed poorly.
The main policy that hindered the PT’s performance was the prohibition on electoral
alliances. This rule was created at the national level out of the belief that by not allying
itself with other parties the PT would not compromise its ideals. Locally, this strategy

Welscm Gasparini Estd Eleito e Vai Assumir Pela Terceira Ve:a Prefeituro Mimicipol. [ 17]/1 1/1988. in
ACidade. 10.
84
Brizola (1922-2004) was one of the most influential leftist leaders in Brazil since the 1960s. He was seen
by many as the ideological heir of his brother-in-law. former president Joao Goiilart and former president
Getiilio Vargas.
SS
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severely hampered the party's chances of actually winning elections. The PT’s campaign
had fewer resources than its competitors, whose candidates benefited from the resources
of its coalitional partners. This forced the PT in Ribeirao Preto to rely on less expensive
means of campaigning that tended to focus on strategies that brought them into closer
contact with the people. The PT, realizing the improbability of an electoral victory,
focused most of its campaigning energy on the dissemination of its ideology as a means
of increasing its chances in later elections.^^ This does not mean that the PT considered
the 1988 election to be hopeless. In fact, it was able to elect one candidate to the
Chamber of Aldermen.
The victory of PT's Antonio Palocci Filho’s in the 1988 election for Chamber of
Aldermen signified an important moment for the local PT. This election marked the
beginning of Antonio Palocci Filho’s career as a politician. He began to build his public
resume in the early 1980s. As a medical student, he was president of the Centro
Accidemico Rocha Lima, a student organization at the University of Sao Paulo. He later
87

led several unions including the Associagao dos Medicos Residentes de Ribeirao Preto.
He also has the distinction of being a founding member of the Ribeirao Preto branch of
the PT and later in 1988 became the first of its members to win an election to the
Ribeirao Preto Chamber of Aldermen. As the only PT member in the Chamber of
Aldermen in 1988 he promoted many policies endorsed by the party. As a result, he
obtained the attention of most PT sympathizers and soon w'as seen as the one responsible
for these programs. In essence, these programs soon became ‘Talocci’s policies” instead

Politico Riheirdopretana. 10/14/1988. in A Cidade. 3.
Biografia: Antonio Palocci- PT/SP. 4/14/2008. in Dados do Deputado. Camara dos Deputados.
htlp://www2.camara.gov.br/internet/deputados/biodepiitado/index.html?nome=ANTON10+PALOCCI&leg
=53.
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of “PT policies.*' This allowed him to forge a position in which he -much like Lula
nationally- became the “face" of the PT. His prominence within the party culminated
88

w ith his nomination as the PT's candidate for mayor in the 1992 elections.
The PT-PSDB alliance in the mayoral election of 1992 was an effect of an
ideological approximation between the two parties, which was, in turn, a result of the
changes implemented by the PT in the late 1980s and early 1990s, The lifting of the
prohibition on electoral alliances was the most significant of these alterations. It
authorized the local PT to pursue alliances with ideologically similar parties. The
loosening of this restriction and the abandonment of certain radical ideas by the PT (e.g.
centrally planned economy) brought it ideologically closer to the PSDB. In Ribeirao
Preto, the PT and PSDB cooperated extensively during Palocci’s 1992 campaign, in
89

which they were the major partners of tlie alliance.

Palocci’s running mate, Joaquim

Rezende, was the local PSDB President.
The Palocci-Rezende ticket successfully qualified for and, ultimately, won the
second round of the election against Antonio Duarte Nogueira Junior of the PFL. Both
parties extended the electoral alliance to the municipal administration in which the PSDB
controlled a number of influential posts: Deputy Mayor and the Secretarial posts of
Finance, Legal Affairs and Sports. The PSDB was also placed in charge of two out of the
90

six service businesses run by the government.

Palocci even selected a PSDB member

Roberto Luiz Alves Cangussu. Conversation. 1/4/2008. Camara Municipal.
’ Other parties in the coalition included: the PSB.PPS, and the PV.
Government owned businesses are a very common in Brazil. These businesses usually provide some
form of service to the community that is considered indispensable. They are considered an indirect part of
the administration who.se heads are nominated by the executive. They are common in areas such as watei.
waste management, and public transportation: Pahcci Ammcioii os Responsdveis pelas Autarquias
Municipais. 12/.'ll/1992. in A Cidade. Ribeirao Preto. 8.
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to be one of the three coordinators of his transition team.

The PSDB’s prominence

within the administration caused unhappiness within the PT, where some argued that the
party had compromised too much by giving high ranking positions to other parties.
These dissenters did not outwardly express their discontentment because of the upcoming
92

state and federal elections of 1994, which preoccupied them.
The Federal and Gubernatorial elections of 1994 revealed a weakness in the PT at
the local level. State wide the PT was the single most successful party in the legislative
93

elections winning twice as many votes as its nearest competitor,

It was unable to win

many votes in Ribeirao Preto, however. As table la shows, the PT was not able to get
more than 6,800 votes for its candidates in the Federal Chamber of Deputies, leaving it in
fifth place in terms of total votes won. A coiTuption scandal surrounding Rogerio Buratti
a close ally of Palocci and the administration’s Secretary of Government, undoubtedly
undermined the PT’s electoral possibilities in the city by damaging its claims as an
ethical party.
The election of 1994 revealed even greater problems for the PSDB. It enjoyed
a
great success in the elections for the Federal and State executive. It won both races in
landslide, winning more than twice as many votes as its nearest competitor. Cardoso won
over 145,000 votes w’hile his main rival, Lula, obtained less than 37,000 votes. As foi the
Governor’s race, the PSDB’s Mario Covas won over 108,000 votes; more than his two
94

closest rivals combined.

Yet, at the legislative level, the PSDB won

less than 6,800

Palocci Comedo a Amtuciar Hoje os Names dos Secretdrios do sen Governo. 14, 27/11/1992. in A
Cidade. 14.
Politico Riheirdopretana. 8/11/1994. A Cidade. Ribeirao Preto. 3.
TSE resultados 1994 Deputato Federal
Covas' two main Rivals Francisco Rossi de Almeida(PDT)and Jose Dirceu(PT) won 29.846 and
23.531 respectively.
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voles (Table 1). The PSDB's failure to convert its strong showing in the executive
elections to the legislative elections highlighted a major problem with the party in
Ribeirao Preio. It had not yet made any significant inroad into the politics of Ribeirao
Preto. The votes for Cardoso and Covas were precisely that: votes for Cardoso and
Covas as individual politicians, not for their party.

Table 1
1994- Federal Chamber of Deputies- Ribeirao Preto
Parties

Votes Total

PPR

63423

PFL

27504

PMDB

10872

PSDB

6810

PT

6752

Source: Resiiltado Oficial da Eleigdo em
Ribeirao Preto. 12/10/1994. A Cidade. 14.

The PSDB compensate for its inability to form a base within the city by recruiting
44

mercenary” leaders. These were politicians, whose popularity allowed them to have a

personalistic electoral base that they could transfer to whichever paity they join. This
was crucial for the PSDB at the time because the Brazilian political system is set up in
such a way that the executives at the municipal level are usually the most desired
95

positions.

Because the strongest politicians usually stay within the city it is hard for

newcomers to compete. By obtaining these mercenary politicians the PSDB sidestepped
the problem of building up a strong local party altogether i.e., fighting for political space.

This will be explained in further detail in the next chapter.
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The two most well known politicians that have switched to the PSDB were Welson
Gasparini and Antonio Duarte Nogueira Junior. Both men switched parties several times
during their political careers, and yet they still maintain a firm electoral base.
Welson Gasparini's history is a textbook example of a mercenary politician. He
has been Ribeirao Preto’s most dominant political figure in the latter half of the twentieth
century. He began his political career in 1960 as an alderman for the original PDC and
was elected Mayor in 1964. From 1964 to 1995 he held the posts of Mayor three times
(1964-1969; 1973-1977; 1989-1992), and he was a State Deputy (1971-1973). Dunng
that time, he belonged to a series of parties including: the original PDC(1959-1963), the
original PRP (1964-1966), ARENA (1966-1979), the new PDC(1987-1988) the new
PPR (1993-1995), and then in 1995 he switched to the PSDB.^^ He has politically
outlasted a military coup -and the subsequent dictatorship that followed- the turmoil of
the democratization period and three different party systems while at the same time
maintaining his electoral base. He is the prime example of the mercenary politician.
Antonio Duarte Nogueira Junior has, like Gasparini, built a successful political
career independent of any party. Most of his success has come in legislative elections,
was elected to the Sao Paulo State Chamber of Deputies twice (1995-1999, and 1999
2003) and also to the Federal Chamber of Deputies (2007-present). He has held two
Secretarial posts: State Secretary for Habitagdo do Estado(1995-1996) <xn6. Agricultiua e
Ahastecimento(2003-2006). Like Gasparini, Nogueira Junior has also been a member of
several parties. He began as a member of the PFL in 1985. In 1987, he switched to the
PTB and then later in 1988 he left for Fernando Collor de Mello’s PRN, which he

Biografia: Welson Gasparini: PSDB-SP. 4/16/08. in Deputados. Camara dos Deputados.
http://www2.camara.gov.br/deputados/index.html/loadFrame.html.
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abandoned in 1992, the same year Collor de Mello was impeached. He switched back to
the PFL where he stayed until 1999, when he switched to the PSDB.^^ It helped that he
came from a powerful local political family. His father Antonio Duarte Noguiera Senior
was a successful politician who switched places with Gasparini as mayor of Ribeirao
Prcto from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. Nogueira Junior, built up his career by
taking advantage of his name. Although not as successful as his father, he has come
close to obtaining the mayor's seat most notably in 1992 when he reached the second
round in first place, but was unable to contain Palocci’s momentum,
The entrance of Welson Gasparini and Antonio Duarte Nogueira Junior to the
PSDB changed increased the electoral power of the PSDB in Ribeirao Preto. It brou^pht
the PSDB to prominence within the city’s political arena. As table 2 indicates, had
Gasparini been a PSDB member during the elections of 1994 he would have given the
party over 45,000 more votes giving it almost twice as many votes as

what would have

been its nearest rival the PFL.^^ The Duarte Nogueira Junior also brought with him a
significant political base. In the 1994 elections for State Deputies he won over 58,000
votes in the election of 1994.’” Luiz Roberto Jabali, a prominent local businessman and
Gaspai'ini ally, also joined the PSDB around the same time

as Gasparini. Although not as

powerful politically as Gasaparini or Nogueira, Jabali placed third in the 1988 mayoral
election as a member of the PDC. These three men brought with them a substantial
electoral potential that the PSDB did not have.

Biografio: Duarte Nogueira: PSDB- SP. 3/01/2008. in Dados do Deputado. Camara dos
http://www2.camara.gov.br/internet/deputados/biodeputado/index.htmi?nome=DUARTE+NOGUEI
^ Resuttado Oficial da Eiei^ao em Ribeirao Preto. \2/\i)/\994, \4.
Terminou Ontem a Apuroi^do dos Votos Em Ribeirao Preto. 10/06/1994. A Cidade: Ribeirao Preto. 1-

e
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Table 2

1994- Federal Chamber of Deputies- Ribeirao Preto with Gasparini Alteration

Parties

Votes Total

PSDB+Ga.sparini

53047

PFL

27504

PPR - Gasparini

17186

PMDB

10872

PI'

6752

Source: Resiiltado Oficial da Eleigdo em
Ribeirao Preto. 12/10/1994, 14.
These politicians were lured into the party by the opportunities offered by the
PSDB.100 Luiz Jabali and Duarte Nogueira Junior were both nominated by the party as
101

its mayoral candidate soon after their respective entry into the party,

Nogueira Junior

has also been able to obtain certain Secretarial Positions within the state executive.
Neither Jabali nor Nogueira were able to obtain as much from the PSDB as Gasparini,
however. Soon after joining the PSDB, Gasparini became one of the three Vice
Presidents of the State Directorate of the PSDB (1995-1997), an entity within the PSDB
responsible for conducting the daily business of the party at the state level that included
the execution of decisions made by the State Directorate, connecting local Directorates to
102

the national Directorate and the power of budget approval.

He was later named Vice

Leader of the PSDB in the Chamber of Deputies(1996-1999), a position that requires the

100

Gasparini left the party in favor of the PTB briefly in 2002 after he failed to win a seat in the Chamber
of
Deputies,
but he returned again in 2004.
101
Jabali was the PSDB’s mayoral candidate in 1996; he joined the party in 1995. Noguiera Junior was the
candidate
in 2000; he joined the party in 1999.
10
“ PSDB. 10/21/1989. Estatnfo. Ti'tulo III. Capftulo II. Sec. III. Art. 85, 86. Brasilia: DJ.
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103

individual holding it to pursue the ideological interest of the party above his own.

In

just sixteen years Gasparini went from being a member of the military-backed ARENA to
helping a party -formed by many who opposed the military regime- pursue its daily
business and, more importantly, its ideological goals.
The local PSDB was changed by the internal tension brought about by the influx
of these new members. The PSDB became divided between those who accepted the new
members (the pro-mercenaries) and those who did not(anti-mercenaries). This situation
culminated in a crisis during the mayoral election of 1996. The anti-mercenaries wanted
to maintain the electoral alliance with the PT, The pro-mercenaries, on the other hand.
wanted the party to field its own candidate, Gasparini’s political ally and prominent
businessman, Luiz Roberto Jabali. After much debate, the decision was made to ha
Jabali run for mayor, but this did not end the antagonism between both factions. The
anti-mercenaries went against the party’s decision and supported the PT s mayor
candidate Sergio Roxo da Fonseca, a local prosecutor

This decision eventually led to the

expulsion of the anti-mercenaries from the party, which moved the PSDB farther
104

the center creating a “new-PSDB” within the city.
The PSDB’s acceptance of the mercenary politicians was

the underlying factor

behind the antagonistic PT-PSDB relationship that began developing during the election.
As tables 3 and 4 indicate, the election was closely contested, with Jabali winning with
margin of Just over 1,500 votes. The situation was further aggravated by the ad hominem
105

campaign tactics adopted during that election.

This was the electoral beginning of the

KM

Biografm: Welson Gasparini PSDB-SP:
Art. 49. Brasilia: DJ.

10/21/1989. Estatuto. Ti\u\o

104
lO.S

Roberto Luiz Alves Cangussii. Conversation. 1/4/2008. Camara Municipal.
Roberto Luiz Alves Cangussii 1/4/2008.
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polarization of the city's political arena between both parties. While the election itself
was a defining moment in the PT-PSDB relationship, it is important to remember that the
fundamental reason for the antagonism was a shift in the PSDB. This “new PSDB had
united many of the city's prominent conservative politicians, who were ideologically
incompatible with the PT. Nogueira Junior was member of the conservative PFL, which,
together with the PP was part of the military-backed ARENA party. Gasparini, himself
was also a fonner member of ARENA and later the PDC before joining the PSDB.
.Although Jabali was not a career politician, his close political ties to Gasparini suggests
. 106

These

that his political views were not all that dissimilar from those of Gasparini.
politicians came from parties located further right on the political spectrum than was the
PSDB originally causing it to shift further towards the right. The tension generated by
these new members exercised the more leftist elements within the local PSDB. This
meant that those same elements, which were ideologically closest to the PT, were no
longer a part of the PSDB,leaving that party less inclined to cooperate with the P
new PSDB” was consolidated during the following the federal elections of 1998 and the
municipal election of 2000. The most voted PSDB member in the election for Ch
of Deputies was Gasparini who obtained around 23,000 out of the over 30,000 votes
107

gained by the PSDB.

Gasparini’s over 23,000 votes were not enough for him to obtain

a seat in the Chamber Deputies and were far fewer than the nearly 60,000 votes he had
acquired four years earlier. The candidate chosen by the PSDB to compete in the

IO(i

Gasparini has had a great influence in the political life of Jabali. He endorsed Jabali in his taile attemp
at the mayor’s seat. Both men also entered the PSDB around the same time and according to Jabali s
widow, it was Gasparini who asked her husband to run tor public office.
107
Elek'des Gerais de 1998. 10/8/1998. TRE-SP. 4.
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Mayoral race of 2000 was Duarte Nogueira Junior. These two events indicate that the
PSDB strategy was one based on the persona of the candidates mnning for office.
Table 3
1996 - Mayoral Election - Ribeirao Preto - First Round
Nominal
Party
PT

Candidate

Situation

Votes

VcA^alid Votes

Sergio Roxo

87.514

2nd round

38.0

Liiiz Jabali

74.817

2nd round

32.5

PFL

Corauci Sobrinho

31.408

Eliminated

13.6

PPB

Gilberto Sampaio

27.777

Eliminated

12.0

l^SDE

Source: Consulto de Residtados Eleitorais. Resultado
da Eleigao 1996 rTurno. 10/27/2005. TSE.

Table 4
1996 - Mayoral Election - Ribeirao Preto - Second Round
Party

Candidate

PSDB

Luiz Jdbali

PT

Sergio Roxo

Nominal Votes

Situation

115.098
113.526

%/Valid Votes

Elected

50.3

Eliminated

49.7

Source: Comdta de Residtados Eleitorais. Resultado
da Eleigao 1996 2° Tiirno. 10/27/2005. TSE.

The PSDB’s shift in Ribeirao Preto mimics what occurred at the national level
after Cardoso’s election in 1994. The PSDB’s acceptance of the mercenary politicians
108

led some of the more leftist politicians within the party to leave,

The PSDB’s decision

to accept these politicians is a pragmatic decision. At the national level the party
accepted these politicians so that they could expand their power in congress and insure
that Cardoso’s policies could be implemented. The PSDB’s decision to accept the local
mercenary politician was also one of pragmatism. Those politicians were stronger than

108

The national events are described in further detail in the PSDB chapter.

Cerdeira 41 of67

Senior Thesis

anyone the PSDB could fields and if those candidates were elected to congress they
would strengthen the PSDB. This pragmatism is what led the PSDB to become an
ideologically different party than it had been in the late 1980s.
Despite having lost the mayoral election of 1996, the PT’s popularity continued to
grow in Ribeirao Preto. The PT's rise in popularity in the late 1990s in Ribeirao Preto
was the primary reason for Gasparini’s failure to retain his seat in the Federal Chamber of
Deputies. In that same election, former mayor Antonio Palocci Filho won over 60.000
. 109

more votes than his nearest rival, Welson Gasparini.

As Brazil’s electoral system

allow's each citizen one vote for Federal Deputy, the unprecedented 83,279 votes won by
Palocci, severely limited the number of votes left for other candidates. With the
exception of the Presidential race, the PT success in the Chamber of Deputies was
’s race the voters of Ribeirao
repeated in every contest that year (1998). For the governor
Preto gave the PT’s Marta Suplicy over 6,000 more votes
110

Covas.

than the eventual winner Mario

This was a remarkable result when one considers Mario Covas’ populanty. In

the senatorial election, Eduardo Suplicy won tlie most votes in Ribeirao Preto with almost
111

94,000 votes.

One of the main reasons behind PT’s continued rise in popularity was its effective
management of the city during Palocci’s administration (1992-1996). One of the biggest
tools used by the PT in municipal administration was the notion of Orgamento
Participativo (Participatory Budget). In Participatory Budgets, citizens form groups
dedicated to a certain area e.g., street pavement. These citizens then voted on projects to
109

Elei^des Gerais de 1998. 10/8/1998,4.TSE.
Vota^ao No Miininpio/Pais 1998 -r tiimo: Sao Paulo: Ribeirao Preto: Governador. 12/15/2005. in
“Consulta de Resultados Eleitorais.’' TSE.
II I
Vota^ do No Mimicipio/Pais 1998 -r turno: Sdo Paulo: Riheirdo Preto: Senador. 12/15/2005. in
"Consulta de Resultados Eleitorais.” TSE.
110
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determine their respective priority for the administration. Palocci implemented
successfully implemented this program in Ribeirao Preto. In fact, his administration was
112

recognized as one of the most innovative of the country,

The PT successfully applied

113

this policy in many other cities under its control.
The PT's electoral dominance continued in the Mayoral election of 2000. In that
election, Antonio Palocci once again competed as PT’s nominee. As his record-breaking
1998 election for Chamber of Deputies indicated, he was an extremely popular political
figure. Most of this popularity came from his first term as Mayor(1992-1996). Many
saw him as a very effective administrator; winning several commendations including.
Children and Peace award from UNICEF in 1995 and the SEBRAE s Jucelino
Kubitschek in 1996 and he would later win the Mario Covas awards in 2001 from that
114

same organization,

It is little wonder that he won the election in a landslide; winning

in the first round with fifty-six percent of the vote, while his PSDB rival, Nogueira
Junior, won only eleven percent of the vote. The electoral difference between the two
candidates is remarkable when one considers that only eight years earlier Palocci barely
reached the second round of the election to compete against Nogueira Junior.
Palocci was the most formidable candidate of the PT. His choice for mnning
mate. Gilberto Maggioni, strengthened Palocci’s appeal. As the former president of the
business oriented Associagao Comercial e Industrial(Commerce and Industry
Association, ACI), Maggioni gave Palocci greater credibility within the business

"■ Palocci Aposta na Participa^ao Popular para Resolver Problemas da Crian^a e doAdolecente.
9/2/2000. in A Cidade. Ribeirao Preto.
113

William R. Nylen. 2003. Participatory Democracy versus Elitist Democracy. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan. 49-50.
I 14

Biografia: Antonio Palocci -PT/SP. in “Dados do Depiitado". 3/30/2008. Camara dos Deputados.
http://www2.camara.gov .br.
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community,

115

The PT’s selection of Maggioni as Palocci’s running-mate was a result of

the PT*s greater strategy of moderation that came out of the mid 1990s. It was an attempt
at reassuring the wider public that the PT was not a radical party and appeal to the
undecided voters. The PT later implemented this same strategy at the national level
during the presidential elections of 2002 in which, Lula selected Jose Alencar(PRB), a
wealthy businessman from Minas Gerais as his mnning-mate. As Palocci was one of
President Lula’s top advisors during and after the presidential elections of 2002, some
have made a direct correlation between Palocci’s strategy in the city and Lula s at the
national level.116 Palocci was the coordinator of Lula s transition team and later became
Brazil’s Finance Minister leaving his Deputy Mayor, Gilberto Maggioni, to assume the
administration of Ribeirao Preto.
The PT’s electoral success nationally did not lead to a victory for the party in the
2004 mayoral election. Maggioni had the worst showing of any PT candidate since
before 1992. He was not even able to make it to the second round of the elections. This
poor showing was a result of Maggioni’s inability to motivate the PT base during the
election.1 17 His rise within the party was more of a testament to Palocci’s influence
118

within the PT than to Maggioni’s own power,

Former Mayor Welson Gasparini, who

was once again a member of the PSDB, became mayor for the fourth time.
With respect to the PT-PSDB relationship, politics of Ribeirao Preto appeared to
mirror broader national trends. When the PT or the PSDB was unpopular at the national
level, it would be unpopular at the local level as well. One of the most important

IIS

The ACI is an organization which voices the economic concerns of business owners.
Carlos Leopoldo Teixeira Paulino. Conversation. 9/1/2008.
117
Roberto Luiz Alves Cangussu 1/4/2008.
tIK
Roberto Luiz Alves Cangussu 1/4/2008.
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differences between these two parties at the local level is its leadership. The PT’s
leadership has come from within the party, where as the PSDB was able to import
leadership from the political elite of Ribeirao Preto The next chapter will analyze what
the events in Ribeirao Preto tell us about the PT-PSDB relationship and Brazilian
Politics.
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Chapter IV:
Causes and Implications:
The previous three chapters discussed the rise of the PT and the PSDB at the
Federal, State and local levels. The case study chapter focused on how the PT-PSDB
rivalry evolved in Ribeirao Preto. The broader implications of this relationship are
important for the state of Sao Paulo and Brazil as a whole, because reasons behind it
affect all of Brazilian politics, This chapter explains why these two parties became key
rivals in Brazilian politics. It also contains an analysis of the interaction of between both
parties since 1988 at all levels of government and how Brazil’s political system affected
the decisions made by the parties as well as the broader implications of these findings.
In the late 1980s, the PSDB and the PT had little formal interaction with each
other. This state of affairs was the result of the PT’s refusal to align itself with any other
political parties in an effort to remain free of elitist interference. This does not mean that
there was not respect for individuals in other parties. Both the PT and the PSDB s
leadership had been united in opposition to the military government. Many of the leaders
of the PSDB were considered in high esteem by many within the PT some even
119

considered joining the PT when it was first formed.
The lack of formal interaction between both parties also extended to the local
level. Again the PT’s refusal to fraternize with other leftist parties was the main reason.
Its refusal meant that it had to remain on the fringes of politics in Ribeirao Preto until the

119

Margaret Keck 1992. The Workers’ Party and Democratization in Brazil. New Haven; Yale University.
55-59.
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early 1990s. The PSDB on the other hand allied itself with other leftist parties. This
association hampered the young PSDB's ability to differentiate itself from the other
parties, which were better established in the city. In fact, there were few if any mentions
of local PSDB candidates in the newspaper covering the election of 1988.
At this time, the PSDB and PT were both ideologically on the left. The PSDB
had many prominent Social-Democrats as members, such as Mario Covas and Fernando
Henrique Cardoso. It professed a desire to achieve a social democracy and a fairer
distribution of wealth. The PT also sought to redistribute Brazil’s wealth, but their
policies were more drastic. Many within the party advocated measures, such as agrarian
refoiTn, as a means of dealing with Brazil’s social inequalities, and were not at the frint,e
of the party. Lula, during the 1989 election professed desires to implement radical
agrarian reform and a moratorium on debt payments,
Ideological similarities between the PT and the PSDB also existed at the local
. As a
level during this time. The PT centered mostly on the issue of good governance
municipal entity, the party itself could not effectively implement the programs it
defended at the national level, such as the moratorium on debt. This left the party
campaigning on the reputation of its members. Palocci, the PT s most famous member.
won a seat in the Chamber of Aldermen because of his work as a doctor in poor
120

communities.

Palocci’s reputation only increased as his career as alderman progressed

and eventually led him to obtain his party’s nomination for mayor. The local PSDB s
association with other leftist parties in the 1988 mayoral elections (e.g., Brizola s PDT),
indicates that it was also a leftist party with leftist leadership. Ideologically, this meant

120

Politico Riheiraopretana. 10/22/1988. A Cidade. Ribeirao Preto.
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that the PSDB was close to the PT, which became evident in 1992 with their electoral
alliance and their collaboration in the subsequent administration.

The PT’s administration of Ribeirao Preto showed that the local party was

more

pragmatic than some of its more vocal state or national leaders, such as Luiza Erundina.
This was mostly caused by the party's cooperation with other leftist parties m
121

administering the municipality.

Many of the decisions made by the Palocci

administration can be explained by the pragmatic nature of local politics that tends to
. . 122

moderate political parties and politicians who participate in it.
do have some ideology it is often impossible to implement it at a

While local politicians
local level. It would

have been impossible for Palocci to renege on Brazil’s foreign debt as the mayor of a
city. The pragmatism inherent in local politics and Palocci’s alliance with other leftist
parties led to the subsequent moderation of the PT in Ribeirao Preto. The PT PSDB
alliance from 1992-1995 was the fullest extent of their cooperation at the local level.
In the early 1990s. the two parties grew apart ideologically making any further
collaboration between them unlikely at any level of government. This ideological
separation was a result of the broader changes that were affecting Brazil. Ideologically,
the collapse of Marxist model threw the more leftist elements of Brazil into crisis
including many factions within the PT. The breakdown of those models meant that the
PT had to refocus its ideology. This was problematic, because it linked itself closer to
socialism than to democratic socialism. The shift rightward for the PSDB was easier due
to its connection with the social democrats of Western Europe. Their adoption of more
121

Roberto Luiz Alves Cangussii 1/4/2008.
Larry Diamond. 1999. Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press. 131.
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technocratic positions (e.g. neo-liberalism) made it much more acceptable for the PSDB
123

to justify its own shift,

This is when the ideology between the two began to shift more

dramatically with the PSDB becoming more technocratic and the PT struggling to portray
itself as a more acceptable version of socialism.
The implementation of the Real economic plan and the policies followed by the
PSDB administration in the mid 1990s highlighted the PSDB*s new ideological path.
The events immediately prior to, and during, Cardoso’s administration consolidated the
PSDB’s new technocratic nature. First, the success of the Real boosted the status of the
economists within the party and changed the relationship between them and the
traditional politicians, who were to get the policies derived by the economists through
congress. Second, the influx of mercenary politicians into the PSDB,after it won the
presidency, further aggravated the loss of power by the more leftist elements within the
Party. Third, its association with the PFL forced it to compromise and become more
selective in temis of the policies it sought to pass through congress, which led the party to
focus mostly on economic reforms. The PSDB leaders accepted these events because
they were more pragmatic and malleable than the PT in terms of its ideological
124

commitments.

Cardoso, for example,“once a leading exponent of the neo-Marxist

conception of dependencia, dismissed his academic writings as irrelevant to the task at
hand.

I2.<

125

These events eliminated the political space available to the leftist elements

Timothy Power 2003,61 1-633.
'“\Scott Mainwaring. 1995. “Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy.” in Building Democratic
Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, eds. Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully. Stanford:
Stanford University Press. 376.
I
Peter H. Smith. 2005. Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in a Comparative Perspective.
New York: Oxford University Press.
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within the party and forced them out thus creating a “new PSDB;” one less compatible
with the PT, which was still struggling to redefine its ideology.
The PSDB in Ribeirao Preto experienced a similar ideological shift rightward.
There were some differences in the underlying causes for the shift -there was no local
alliance with the parties of the right- but the influx of mercenary politicians did occur.
The local PSDB admitted many politicians who had traditionally been very powerful in
city politics. PSDB's acceptance of these politicians came from above (i.e., the party at
the state level). Thus, the party’s pragmatism at the federal and state level extended to
the local level. The rise of these powerful politicians to prominence within the PSDB led
the more leftward leaning politicians to leave the party. Those who left were the same
ones that had been the most involved with the PT and their expulsion not only shifted the
PSDB further away from the PT, but also eliminated many of the practical connections
between the two parties. The relationship soon became antagonistic due to the very
closely contested campaign of 1996.
The PT’s ideological shift was much slower and not as abrupt. The PT still
considers itself a leftist party, but it accepted the “rules of the game,” (i.e., Brazil’s
democracy and capitalist system) which took a while for the public at large to believe. It
rejected ideas that were previously central to its ideology, such as the implementation of
“Bureaucratic Socialism,” the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the valid use of violence
as means of social change. The “new PT” offered the electorate a version of humanized
capitalism” that involved redirecting funds so as to improve the quality of life of the
“non-elite” instead of socialism.

The biggest problem for the PT was the time it took
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time before people actually began to trust that the PT had changed. From 1994-2002
Lula and the PT attempted time and again to portray the party as ‘trustworthy,’ by
reiterating that it would not reverse privatization, it would not hold a moratorium on debt;
it reversed its position on many issues it had once held at its ideological core.
The electorate trusted the PT much more at the local level than at the Federal
level. The party gained a reputation for honest and effective governance at the local
level. Because the PT needed to prove itself as an honest innovative and a sensible party,
127

it held local and state level politics at greater importance than did the PSDB.
excelled in administering the cities it controlled. The PT s mayors

ThePT

were well-known for

their innovative and effective means of dealing with problems that had previously
128

plagued their respective cities.
The PT did not experience the same success at the Federal level until the
presidential election of 2002. The reputation of the local PT governments helped portray
the party as a trustworthy option. Like Palocci, Lula’s campaign strategy during the 2001
elections focused on portraying him and the party as a tmstworthy. Lula began to dress
in suits instead ofjeans. He also chose a prominent businessman as his mnnmg-mate,just
as Palocci had done in the election of 2000 in Ribeirao Preto. The country’s economic
problems only strengthened the party’s position by accentuating its rhetoric against the
social inequities of the Cardoso administration. The corruption scandal that embroiled
the PSDB-backed administration highlighted the PT’s “clean” image. Finally, the
internal division within the PSDB meant Lula had to run against weakened Jose SeiTa of
the PSDB -a candidate not nearly as charismatic as he.
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The PT-PSDB relationship in Ribeirao Preto can be analyzed from where their
respective leaders derive their power. The PT’s leadership rose from within the party and
made inroads into local politics, because of the party’s mass base. The PSDB on the
other hand, was formed by parliamentarians. There was very little connection between
the party and the average person on the street in Ribeirao Preto. In order to make up for
this, the party accepted the mercenary politicians to lead the party locally. This decision
once again highlights the pragmatism of the PSDB. These politicians were already part
of the local elite. The main threat to their power within the city has been the emergence
of the PT. So the PT has become the party of the opposition to the elite” within the city
and the PSDB has become the party of the “traditional elite” within the city. One of the
reasons these elites chose the PSDB was their desire to portray themselves as socially
129

conscious and thereby increase their chances of obtaining power.
The power of the executive in Brazil is another element that needs to be
understood in order to grasp the reasons behind and the implications of the events in
Ribeirao Preto. The executive branch has been at the center of power in Brazil
throughout its political history. What makes it particularly important is that it
implements the money spent by the government (i.e., it controls how money is spent).
The mayor of a city acts as the local political boss, dispensing political appointments and
implementing certain public works projects. The mayor also obtains a lot of media
attention for his projects, which, in turn, adds to his personal prestige. The same is tme
for someone in the executive branch, but who is not the executive himself(e.g., Secretaiy
of Agriculture). These positions usually offer a great opportunity for politicians, because
they give the politicians access to an entire department within a state government, thus
129
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giving them the ability to make political appointments and the possibility of increasing
their prestige by implementing certain projects. Essentially, a politician wants to be in
the executive, because from there he can then take credit for the implementation of
projects and thus increase his prestige, and, thus his chances of being elected or
130

nominated to another executive position; most likely that of his local municipality.
The position of mayor has become particularly attractive post for rising
politicians, because of political and demographic changes over the last century. First, the
process of urbanization led to a rise in the number of people who live in cities. In the
131

state of Sao Paulo sixty-eight percent of the population lives in cities,

Along with this

population growth, came the process of industrialization, which meant that there were
now many municipalities with larger populations, larger budgets, and larger
bureaucracies. The sheer number of municipalities made them more attractive, because
they were much easier to win than other executive positions (e.g., governorships). In
fact, because Sao Paulo was more urbanized, its politicians tend be more attracted to
132

municipal level positions than to most other levels of government,

These posts were

made even more attractive when the military government(1964-1985), in an attempt to
sidestep the power of the governor, began to deal directly with the mayors giving them
133

greater independence.
Governorships have, traditionally, been the most important executive position in
Brazil. They have traditionally held the most control at the local level and federal level.
Like its municipal counterpart, the state executive derives its influence from the budget it
130
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controls, which in a state like Sao Paulo can be a massive.

The governor’s control of

pork gave him control over legislators and mayors who were usually dependent on
135

money from the state to implement their respective projects,

Adding to this power is

the lack of prestige associated with the legislature at both the federal and state level,
136

which leads the legislator to desire a nomination in the executive branch,

This is what

gave the governors great influence over national, state and local politicians. If a
politician wanted to remain relevant (i.e., in the executive) he had to have a good
relationship with the governor.
The appeal of the executive had less effect on The PT than on other parties. The
137

PT's position as the “outside party” made it an attractive alternative at the local level.
The PT’s image as the “ethical party also gave it greater power in terms of electing a
municipal executive making it unnecessary for the PT to obtain the governor’s support to
attract voters. The fact that Palocci, who was relatively unknown in the early 1990s,
became Lula’s first Finance Minister indicates that there is an opportunity for
advancement within the party. This does not mean that the party did not have to become
more pragmatic. The PT shifted its views towards the center so as to appeal to the
electorate.
The development of the PSDB in Ribeirao Preto is a result of the interaction
between the municipal and state executives. The PSDB’s contracting of mercenaries
came out of the desire to control the executive of a major city in a poweiful state. These
“mercenaries” gave the PSDB what it desired, which was a chance in eveiy election to
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control the executive of the city. The state executive offered these ‘mercenaries’ possible
access to the state executive office after they left the municipal administration, thus
allowing them to remain relevant. Ideally, this relationship would work as follows:
politician ‘A’ is the mayor of Ribeirao Preto for two consecutive terms. Afterwards, he
wins a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. He is then nominated by the governor of the
state to the post of Secretary of ‘X,’ which he would do until he ran once again for
138

mayor.

This policy was exacerbated by the PSDB’s dominance of the executive in Sao

Paulo, which made the party more attractive.
The PSDB’s power in Sao Paulo, at least where it has traditionally been weak such as Ribeirao Preto- has come from mercenary politicians who were attracted to the
parly because of its relationship with the state executive. The PSDB in Ribeirao Preto
adapted itself to the realities of the municipality, by accepting the local elites and their
power base into the party. In return, the elites obtained a closer relationship with the
governorship, which, in turn, increases their chances of rising either within the party

or

within the state executive. This is what happened in the case of Duarte Noguiera Junior,
who became Secretary of Agriculture, and Gasparini, who became PSDB Vice President
139

within the Federal Chamber of Deputies.

These two politicians were attracted to the

PSDB,because of the opportunities the party offered for advancement, and the PSDB
was, in turn. attracted by the opportunity of controlling an influential city and obtaining
strong vote getters.
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Due to the electoral rules and to the political culture of Brazil the PSDB dealt
with local elites in an effort at obtaining greater political space. Politicians in Brazil can
be broken down into two categories in terms of where they get their votes and support:
horizontal and vertical. Horizontal politicians are those who win votes across their
electoral district, which for deputies and senators is their entire state. Vertical politicians
140

are those who obtain a majority of their votes from one locale (e.g., obtain a city).
Having strong vertical politicians significantly improves a party’s chances of obtaining
IS

more seats in the legislature, because Brazil’s electoral system for legislative elections i
based on proportional representation. The PSDB accepted Gasparini and Nogueira
Junior; because both were strong vertical politicians, who could help the PSDB elect its
members to the legislature. In many municipalities, such as

Ribeirao Preto, there are
141

preexisting elites (e.g., Gasparini) that already dominate city’s politics,

It was.

therefore, easier for the PSDB to “recruit” these elites, thereby obtaining political space
that way, than it was for them to build space up itself.
The PSDB-PT rivalry seems to have emerged in Sao Paulo due to the PSDB’s
strength at the state level, the PT’s strength at the local level and the pragmatism of both
parties. The strength of the PSDB in the state appears to come in part from its dominance
at the state level (e.g. its control of the Governorships 1994-present). Aside from that,
most of the party’s most dominant figures at the national level, such as Cardoso, have
come from Sao Paulo. This has made it easier for mercenary politicians to choose to
remain within the PSDB. In an effort to build up a political base, it seems that the PSDB
has recruited a base where it has been weakest in exchange for opportunities after those
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politicians leave their municipal positions. If tlie PSDB decides to follow this model to
gain a base in other states, then it has to have control of the governorships of those states
for a long enough time so as to make them the only game in town. Because the nature of
Brazilian politics makes the municipality one of the most desired posts, it keeps the
traditional political elite within the city. Thus, every political party in Brazil has to make
a choice locally: to work with the elite or compete against it. It has been much easier for
the PT to compete against the elites, because of it derives most of its strength from its
connections to mass politics. The PT has become the only “outside party” that has been
able to challenge these local elites for power. As the “outside party the PT will have to
compete against whichever pai'ty will give the traditional local elite politician the greatest
chance of getting close to the state executive.
The role of the elites in Brazil’s political history further complicates this d)mamic
between parties and the elites. With the notable exception of the protests against the
dictatorship, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most of the political movements m Brazil
142

have been led by elites.

The fact that most of the PSDB’s prominent politicians such

as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Mario Covas and former Sao Paulo Governor Franco
Montoro were all opposition politicians -and influential ones at that- during the
dictatorship is the clearest indication of that party’s connection with the elites. In other
, on
words, the politicians of the PSDB were already part of the political elite. The PT
the other hand, began with very few traditional politicians. The leaders of the PT had.
previously, led various civil society groups (e.g., metalworkers’ union). It had to build
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up political space and experience for itself both of which, the PSDB already had by virtue
of its politicians.
This thesis addresses the question: how and why did the PT and PSDB become
rivals? The relationship between these two parties went from talks of alliances at the
national level to open rivalry. How is it that these two parties, both of which are
nominally leftist, have gone from a similar beginning to having such an antagonistic
present?
Through the chapters of this thesis one can see that the PSDB-PT rivalry is an
outcome of the pragmatism inherent in Brazil’s political system, and both parties dispute
over physical space. The PT moderated itself in an effort to appeal to a broader
electorate. Their pragmatism was more of an “ideological pragmatism,

The PT had to

give up some of its ideology and govern municipalities well in order to gain credibility.
Because the PSDB took over the presidency at a time of economic turmoil, it had to
adopt certain policies tliat were counterintuitive to many leftist parties (e.g.,
privatizations). The PSDB’s pragmatism can, therefore, be described as “programmatic
pragmatism.” This was not as dramatic as shift for the PSDB as it was for the PT,
143

because the PSDB had always been more ideologically malleable than the PT.

In terms

of space, both parties became rivals because the PSDB sought to gain influence over an
area by dealing with the local elites, who were usually the opponents of the PT.
These chapters together provide some interesting indications about the PT. Due
to the way in which it was formed and its links to civil society all over Brazil, the PT will
be the permanent “outside party” to whichever party is able to dominate a certain region.
One of the reasons for this is that it has become much more moderate than it was in the
I4.<
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1980s. This has been especially evident since Lula won the presidency. Some especially in the media- like to divide leftist Latin American leaders into ‘good leftist’
and ‘bad leftist.’ The fact that most consider Lula to fall into the category of a ‘good
leftist' is a testament to the moderation of the PT. The party has, to the dismay of some
144

party members, become the real Social Democratic party of Brazil.
This thesis also gives us some insight into the nature of the PSDB, as well. It has
evolved from its social democratic past to become one of Brazil’s most technocratic
parties. It still has a very strong leadership that has been able to propel the party over the
whole of the state of Sao Paulo. This means that if the party is to expand the its control
to other states it must first obtain a strong presence at the state level and use the carrots
provided by the executive (e.g. secretarial nominations) to lure strong politicians to the
party.
Obtaining an understanding of these two parties is very important for any Brazil
scholar. The PT is one of Brazil’s only mass-based parties and by far the most
successful. The PSDB's dominance of the Sao Paulo and its role in the reforms of the
1990s makes it a very important party. The shift of both parties towards the center is
evidence of a larger movement of the left in Latin America towards the center. Had both
parties emerged forty years earlier and states apart, they might have actually been allies.
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Epilogue
The PT's image as a party has taken a major hit since 2005. That year the party
became embroiled in a political scandal of massive proportions. The scandal wreaked
havoc on the PT’s leadership. Lula was one of the only top PT members to escaped the
scandal relatively unscathed. Former party president and respected PT politician, Jose
145

Genoino, was implecated. Jose Dirceu, Lula's Chief of Staff was also implicated.
The PT lost most of its well known leaders and its reputation for “Ethical” governance
was severely damaged. This was quite problematic for the PT, because it has historically
w on many votes because of this image.
The damage to the PT’s reputation in Ribeirao Preto was worse than at the
national level. Palocci, the politician who personified the PT in Ribeirao Preto was
forced to resign as Finance Minister for attempting to cover up the scandal, which
brought down those prominent national figures. The PT in the city has since stmg^led to
come to terms with the legacy of Palocci. On the one hand, he made the party as
prominent locally as Lula had made it nationally, but he also made many decisions that
were damaging to the party at all levels. Some also feel that he failed to accomplish what
he could have in the city. So how has the party been able to suiwive since the face of the
party was forced to resign over corruption charges?
The PT's has been able to survive Palocci’s resignation because of its
characteristics, which focuses on a strong base. As mentioned in the first chapter, the
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party, slruclLire is based on local ‘nuclei’ which belongs to a directorate which belongs to
a larger nucleus. The base for each individual nucleus is the party member. Thus the
party’s political power is derived from the individual members. It is this connection to
society that is the true power of the PT and leads it to be a strong party. Even though it
has many factions within it. the party is able to maintain itself united -with some
exceptions- because the party is very democratic. In other words, although Palocci was
able to build up an electoral base of support outside of the party, he was built up through
the party. He was an organic leader.
The PSDB’s position in Ribeirao Preto is also complicated, but for a very
different reason. Most of the most powerful leaders in the city have come from outside
parties. What is particularly problematic for the party is that those same leaders have
switched parties on more than one occasion, but since 1999 the local party has not lost
any member. Wliat is it about the party now that has allowed it to retain its mercenary?
What attracted them to the party? And will they still be members if the governorship
changes?
It is unlikely that the current system of doing politics will progress, due to
institutional changes, which will severely limit the power of the mercenary politician
The Supreme Court in Brazil has ruled that electoral mandates belong to parties and not
to individual politicians. This means that the party switching that occurs after elections
will no longer happen, because political parties will have the right to replace those
politicians who leave the party for personal benefits. This should foice the mercenary
politician to settle down and accept one party.
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